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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Survey period found the courts reviewing expert cases more
than any other topic. The timing of an expert report received the
greatest attention, while expert loyalty and party subterfuge fol-
lowed closely behind. The Texas Supreme Court weighed in on the appli-
cation of the peer review privilege to nursing homes, and the courts of
appeals addressed the appropriateness of deposing counsel. And, al-
though sanctions cases focused more on procedural issues, the Eastland
Court of Appeals reminded us that sometimes a client is not accountable
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for his lawyer's conduct-in that case, neglect that resulted from severe
depression.
II. ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Expert testimony was the topic of many opinions this Survey period.
The reliability of expert testimony was explored in drug and DNA-testing
cases, and expert qualifications were addressed in two cases concerning
chiropractors. Whether or not an expert can switch sides also was ad-
dressed in two different cases. While no topic was covered more than the
timeliness of expert reports, there were also new cases interpreting the
Daubert and Robinson requirements for expert testimony.
A. THE FEDERAL DAUBERT CASES
In Easter v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Texas granted the defendants' motion to preclude
the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert witness. The plaintiffs alleged that
their son, Jordan, suffered neurological injuries after he was given a vac-
cine containing the chemical thimerosal, which contains ethyl mercury.
Although the plaintiffs' son also suffered from autism, the plaintiffs con-
ceded that they could not prove the autism was caused by thimerosol.
Instead, they sought to prove that other co-morbid conditions that the
child suffered were caused by thimerosol. The defendants filed a motion
to preclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, arguing that the expert
could not prove specific causation between the exposure to thimerosal
and Jordan's condition. The plaintiffs' expert relied on the technique of
differential diagnosis, in which one attempts to eliminate possible causes
for a patient's symptoms until reaching one cause that cannot be ruled
out. That one cause is then determined to be the most likely cause of an
illness or condition.' The court excluded the expert testimony because
the plaintiffs' expert could not rule out the possibility that the co-morbid
conditions were caused by the autism and not by the vaccine.2
B. THE STATE ROBINSON CASES
In In re S.E.W. and S.A.W., parents appealed the termination of their
parental rights. The parents alleged that the trial court erred in allowing
an expert to testify on behalf of the Texas Department of Protective and
Regulatory Services. The expert, James Turnage, was called to testify
about drug testing performed on both parents. After his company con-
ducted drug and DNA hair testing, he provided a report that included his
opinion that both the mother and father recently had ingested cocaine.
Although Turnage was certified in the administration and collection of
such hair specimens, he did not personally perform the tests to determine
the presence of drugs. He admitted that he had no knowledge of how the
1. 358 F. Supp. 2d 574, 575 (E.D. Tex. 2005).
2. Id. at 576.
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actual tests were performed on the samples, what protocols were used, or
what standards might have applied. He also admitted that he was not an
expert on the operation of the instruments used to conduct such a test.
Therefore, the Dallas Court of Appeals found that Turnage was not quali-
fied to give an opinion as to the results of these tests based on evidence
that his company had collected. His interpretation of the laboratory re-
sults was not reliable because "he did not have expertise concerning the
actual subject about which he offered his expert opinion."'3 The court
stated that it was not suggesting that the testing methods used by the
laboratory were unreliable; rather, it was only holding that the record did
not establish the reliability of the methods by evidence or through re-
quest for judicial notice. The court could not accept that the results were
reliable simply because Turnage claimed that they were. Therefore, the
court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion in admitting
Turnage's testimony after the Daubert/Robinson challenge. 4
C. EXPERT REPORTS AND AFFIDAVITS
In the case of Group v. Vicento, the Fourteenth District Court of Ap-
peals in Houston held that an anesthesiologist was practicing healthcare
in a field involving the same type of care as a chiropractor, and therefore
the anesthesiologist was allowed to testify as an expert witness in a chiro-
practic medical-malpractice case. In this case, a police officer, Mark
Vicento, suffered back injuries in an automobile accident and sought
treatment from a chiropractor, Edward Group. Vicento alleged negli-
gence against Group, arguing that Group should have referred him to an
expert in spinal surgery and that the delay caused him injury and pain. To
support his medical-malpractice claim, Vicento filed an expert report
from Rezik Saqer, M.D. Group attempted to dismiss Vicento's case,
claiming that Dr. Saqer's expert report did not comply with Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351. Specifically, he alleged that
Dr. Saqer was not qualified to discuss the chiropractic standard of care to
which Group should be held because he was not a chiropractor. 5 The
court, however, found that Group's interpretation of the Code was re-
strictive and contrary to the statute's plain language, which "does not re-
quire an expert to be practicing healthcare in the same field as the
defendant healthcare provider," but only "in a field of practice involving
the same type of care or treatment."'6 Dr. Saqer stated in his expert report
that his qualifications as an anesthesiologist specializing in anesthesia and
pain management overlapped with chiropractic care. He stated that the
forms of treatment he used, including massage therapy and "[o]scillation
of pain centers," "overlap[ped] and intertwine[d] with chiropractic prac-
tice," and that "chiropractors and pain management physicians use simi-
3. 168 S.W.3d 875, 882-83 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet. h.).
4. Id. at 884-85.
5. 164 S.W.3d 724, 726 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. filed).
6. Id. at 731 (emphasis in original).
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lar methods to evaluate patients and determine whether to refer them to
a specialist for surgical consultation." 7 In addition, he claimed that he
knew the accepted standard of care required of chiropractors for the type
of injury involved in the case because more than 20% of the patients that
he treated suffered from similar conditions. Because of these qualifica-
tions, the court concluded that Dr. Saqer was practicing healthcare in a
field of practice involving the same type of care and treatment as the
chiropractor. Therefore, Dr. Saqer was competent to serve as an expert
witness against the chiropractor. 8
In another case involving a chiropractor, Hayhoe v. Henegar, the issue
on appeal concerned the qualifications of a chiropractor expert to testify
as to what caused plaintiff Henegar's need for back surgery. Henegar,
while stopped at a red light, was hit from behind by Hayhoe. Henegar's
treating physician and expert witness was a chiropractor, Bobby Hol-
lander. Hayhoe alleged that Dr. Hollander was not qualified to testify
about Henegar's need for surgery because he was not a surgeon.9 The
Eastland court, however, noted that Dr. Hollander had 20 years of chiro-
practic experience, that he had done post-graduate work in the field, and
that he had treated other patients with the same condition as the plaintiff
and knew when to refer those patients to a surgeon. Therefore, because
of his "extensive experience with chiropractic medicine in general and
herniated discs in particular," the court found that the trial court had not
abused its discretion in finding Dr. Hollander qualified to testify regard-
ing the plaintiff's need for surgery and that his report and testimony were
factually sufficient evidence of causation.' 0
In the case of State Office of Risk Management v. Escalante, the plain-
tiff, Escalante, was injured in a car accident as he drove between work
sites. The State Office of Risk Management ("SORM") attempted to
avoid paying workers' compensation for Escalante's claimed injuries by
alleging that he had failed to present the necessary expert evidence as to
the extent of his injuries. Under the Workers' Compensation Act, a com-
pensable injury is "damage or harm to the physical structure of the
body."11 Even though Escalante had no injuries that resulted in a visible
change to his body, the Eighth Court of Appeals in El Paso held that his
evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury's findings of compensable inju-
ries to the plaintiff's spine because "[iut is not necessary to present expert
medical testimony in order to establish a compensable new injury."' 12
Therefore, the court determined that the jury reasonably could have con-
cluded from Escalante's medical records and his own testimony that he
had been injured.' 3
7. Id. at 732-33.
8. Id. at 734.
9. 172 S.W.3d 642, 643-44 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
10. Id. at 644.
11. 162 S.W.3d 619, 624 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2005, no pet. h.).




In Formosa Plastics Corp., USA v. Kajima International, Inc., the court
dealt with an issue of first impression in Texas-whether an expert who
switches sides in a lawsuit should be disqualified. In this case, Formosa
retained an associate at A.W. Hutchison & Associates, Inc. ("AWH") to
be a consulting expert during the lawsuit. AWH performed work for For-
mosa and received over $20,000 for that case. Later, Kajima contacted
AWH about working on the same case as its consulting expert, and two
associates of AWH were designated as Kajima's testifying experts. After
a jury trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Kajima, and Formosa
appealed, alleging that the trial court erred when it refused to disqualify
Kajima's expert witnesses. 14 The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
adopted the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' two-part test for deter-
mining whether to disqualify an expert who switches sides. The court
considered two issues: "(1) was it objectively reasonable for the first party
who claims to have retained the expert to conclude that a confidential
relationship existed between that party and the expert; and (2) did the
first party disclose any confidential or privileged information to the ex-
pert?" 15 As to the first issue, the appellate court considered the informa-
tion that had passed between Formosa and AWH. This information
included a letter identifying AWH's work product and plans for how to
handle the case against Kajima. Based on this, the court concluded that it
was reasonable for Formosa to believe that a confidential relationship
had been established with AWH.16 As to the second issue, whether For-
mosa actually disclosed confidential information to the AWH associate,
the court concluded that Formosa had discussed confidential information,
including the potential advantages of deposing certain witnesses, the data
gathered from witnesses, and Formosa's strategies for handling the case. 17
Therefore, the court held that Formosa met both burdens: 1) it was rea-
sonable to conclude that a confidential relationship had been established
between Formosa and AWH, and 2) that it had indeed disclosed confi-
dential information to the AWH associate. The court therefore reversed
the judgment for Kajima and remanded for a new trial.18
In Aguilar v. Morales, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in El Paso
considered the issue of side-switching experts. In that case, the Aguilars
filed suit against Morales, the executrix of an estate, for the alleged
breach of an oral agreement granting an easement. They also sought
damages for the alleged discharge of agricultural waste from the defen-
dant's farm onto plaintiffs' land. The plaintiffs eventually dropped the
breach-of-contract claim, but added claims for nuisance and trespass, con-
tending that their well had been contaminated by manure from the defen-
dant's farm. The defendant served a request for production and
14. No. 13-02-385-CV, 2004 WL 2534207, at *1 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Nov. 10,
2004, no pet. h.).
15. Id. at *2.
16. Id. at *3.
17. Id. at *3-6.
18. Id. at *7.
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inspection on the plaintiffs to test the well water. The plaintiffs de-
manded the identity of the person doing the testing. The defendant ini-
tially refused to disclose the identity of the consulting expert to the
plaintiffs because she was concerned that the plaintiffs would attempt to
contact the expert witness, but the trial court required the disclosure.
Shortly after the samples were drawn, the plaintiffs contacted the defen-
dant's consulting expert and hired him to serve as an expert witness for
them. 19 At trial, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant and refused to allow the plaintiffs' expert witness to testify. In
addition, the trial court sanctioned the plaintiffs for violating Rule 4.02(b)
of the Rules of Professional Conduct. In rebuttal, the plaintiffs argued
that the expert that they consulted was not a consulting expert of the
defendant.2 0 A consulting expert is defined in the Texas Rules as "an
expert who has been consulted, retained, or specially employed by a party
in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial, but who is not a
testifying expert. '2 1 The plaintiffs claimed that, because the expert had
not entered into a written contract with the defendant, he was not a con-
sulting expert for the defendant. The appellate court disagreed, noting
that the defendant's attorney considered the expert to be a consulting
expert. In fact, the attorney initially refused to disclose his information
specifically because he feared that the plaintiffs would try to contact the
expert without his consent. The court said that a "lack of a written con-
tract or payment of a consulting expert retainer is not dispositive of the
issue."'22 The court thus found the evidence sufficient to support the
lower court's finding that the expert had been consulted and employed by
the defendant as a consulting expert. Therefore, the court concluded that
the plaintiffs' contact with the expert was an abuse of the discovery pro-
cess that justified sanctions. 23
In Kendrick v. Garcia, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in East-
land dealt with two procedural issues of first impression. First, the court
addressed the appropriate construction of the terms "serve" and "served"
in Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 74.351 regarding the
requirement of expert reports in healthcare-liability cases. In addition,
the court determined whether an unsuccessful effort to serve an expert
report could be excused if the effort was made in good faith. In this case,
plaintiff's counsel alleged that she placed a copy of the expert's reports in
a box in the district clerk's office that was assigned to the law firm repre-
senting the defendant, and she mailed a copy of the reports to the co-
defendant's attorney via first class mail. However, opposing counsel
stated that they did not receive those copies of the reports; instead they
first received the expert report via fax after the deadline to serve such
19. 162 S.W.3d 825, 830 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2005, no pet. h.) (citing TEX. R. Civ. P.
192.7(d)).
20. Id. at 831-32.
21. Id. at 832.




reports had passed. 24 As to the first issue, the court determined that the
terms "serve" and "served" as used in the statute were synonymous with
service under Rule 21a of the Texas Rule of Civil Procedure, which speci-
fies the methods by which litigation documents may be served. Since the
terms "serve" and "served" have distinct legal meaning, the court applied
that legal meaning to the terminology within the statute. Rule 21a re-
quires service to a party or its agent in person, by agent, by courier, by
registered or certified mail, or telephonic document transfer. Thus,
neither placing a copy of the reports in the opposing party's box nor mail-
ing the reports by first-class mail met Rule 21a's requirements. 25 On the
topic of a good-faith exception, the court ruled that, in an update to the
statute regarding healthcare-liability claims, the legislature withdrew the
accident or mistake exception by which a claimant could attempt to ex-
cuse the failure to timely furnish an expert report. Therefore, the court
concluded that "the new statute precludes the existence of a good-faith
exception to the requirement of timely serving expert reports," 26 and
thus, the expert report was not served on the defendant in a timely man-
ner. Consequently, the court reversed the trial court's order denying the
defendant's motion to dismiss and rendered judgment in his favor, dis-
missing the plaintiff's claims. 27
In Mokkala v. Mead, the Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in
Houston held that a plaintiff cannot avoid the expert filing requirements
in section 74.351 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code merely
by nonsuiting. In this case, the plaintiff filed suit twice, failed to file ex-,
pert reports twice, nonsuited its claims against the healthcare providers
twice, and finally filed the same claim against the healthcare providers in
the ultimate 2004 case.28 The court concluded that the 120-day period set
forth in section 74.351(a) ran from the date of the first petition asserting a
healthcare-liability claim. As the court stated, "under the plain language
of section 74.351(a), the 120-day period is triggered on the date the claim-
ant files a petition alleging a particular healthcare liability claim, not the
date she files another lawsuit asserting that same claim."'29 This period
expired before the plaintiff nonsuited its claims against the healthcare
providers. Therefore, because the plaintiff did not serve the report within
the 120-day period after the first filing, the trial court had erred in deny-
ing the health care providers' motion to dismiss.30
In Marks v. St. Luke's Episcopal Hospital, the First District Court of
Appeals in Houston made a distinction between premises-liability and
healthcare-liability claims. In that case, the plaintiff had tried to push
himself up from his hospital bed when the footboard upon which he was
24. 171 S.W.3d 698, 700-01 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, pet. filed).
25. Id. at 704.
26. Id. at 705.
27. Id.
28. 178 S.W.3d 66, 68 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. filed).
29. Id. at 71.
30. Id. at 76.
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leaning fell off, causing him to fall and experience severe injuries. The
plaintiff alleged breach of the duty of ordinary care against the hospital;
however, he did not file an expert report on the matter within 180 days of
filing as required by section 74.351. The hospital filed a motion to dismiss
the plaintiff's claims on the basis that the claims were actually healthcare-
liability claims that required the filing of an expert report.31 The court,
however, stated that the plaintiff did not need to file an expert report
because "[t]he underlying nature of his allegations is of an unsafe condi-
tion created by an item of furniture. Such a complaint relates to premises
liability, not health care liability, and is governed by the standard of ordi-
nary negligence. '32 Therefore, because the plaintiff's complaint was
based on a premises-liability and not a healthcare-liability claim, no ex-
pert report was required under the statute.33
Alvarez v. Thomas concerned another plaintiff who failed to file an
expert report within 180 days of the petition filing. On March 22, 2004,
the doctor defendant mailed the district clerk a motion to dismiss the
plaintiff's petition for failure to file an expert report. On March 23, the
plaintiff hand-filed his fourth amended petition, which included a nonsuit
of the doctor defendant. The doctor's motion to dismiss was not received
by the clerk of court until March 25. The doctor sought the application of
the mailbox rule under Rule 5 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure be-
cause he deposited the motion to dismiss in the mail before the plaintiff's
nonsuit was filed.34 The court held "that Rule 5's 'mailbox rule' does not
apply where there is no preset deadline for filing a document, so [the
plaintiff] actually filed his nonsuit before [the defendant] filed his motion
to dismiss."' 35 However, because the plaintiff did not argue the inapplica-
bility of Rule 5 to a situation in which there was no preset deadline for
filing a document, the court held that the plaintiff did not preserve his
error and affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his action with
prejudice. 36
In re Huag dealt with a discovery stay imposed before the filing of an
expert report in a medical-malpractice action. In this case, the defendant
medical providers sought mandamus relief against the trial court's order
granting the plaintiffs' motion to compel deposition testimony. At issue
was subsection 74.351(s) of the Texas Medical Liability Act ("TMLA"),
which "stays all discovery in a medical malpractice suit until the expert
report has been filed, unless excepted. '37 All discovery is "stayed except
for the acquisition by the claimant of information, including medical or
hospital records or other documents or tangible things, related to the pa-
31. 177 S.W.3d 255, 257-58 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. filed).
32. Id. at 259.
33. Id. at 260.
34. 172 S.W.3d 298, 300-01 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
35. Id. at 301.
36. Id.
37. 175 S.W.3d 449, 451-52 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.) (citing
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(s)(l)-(3) (Vernon 2005)).
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tient's health care through: ... (2) depositions on written questions under
Rule 200, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. ' 38 Subsection 74.351(u), how-
ever, states: "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this section, after a
claim is filed all claimants, collectively, may take not more than two dep-
ositions before the expert report is served as required by [s]ubsection
(a)."' 39 The plaintiffs claimed that subsection (u) expanded the discovery
permitted in subsection (s), allowing claimants to take two oral or written
depositions of parties or non-parties in addition to the depositions per-
mitted by subsection (S).40 To the contrary, the defendants argued that
subsection (u) only served to further restrict the exceptions permitted in
subsection (s). The court considered the construction of the statute and
noted that "the numerical limitation in subsection 74.351(u) would be
given no effect if unlimited depositions were permitted by subsection
74.351(s) and two additional depositions were permitted by subsection
74.351(u)." 41 The court also considered the goals of the Texas Legislature
in promulgating the Texas Medical Liability Act, which included decreas-
ing the cost, frequency, and severity of healthcare-liability claims. Thus,
the court held "that subsection 74.351(s) of the TMLA defines the type of
permissible discovery excepted from the stay imposed prior to service of
the expert's report and that subsection 74.351(u) restricts all claimants
collectively to taking not more than two depositions of the types permit-
ted by subsection 74.351(s) during the stay."'42 Because of this holding,
the court concluded that the trial court had abused its discretion when it
compelled the relators to give deposition testimony.43
In Hillcrest Baptist Medical Center v. Wade, the Tenth Court of Appeals
in Waco considered the sufficiency of three expert reports filed to support
a medical-malpractice claim. The defense argued that the plaintiff had
not made a good-faith effort to comply with expert report requirements.
The plaintiff argued that the three expert reports, taken together, demon-
strated a good-faith effort at meeting the elements required for a suffi-
cient expert report.44 The court agreed with the plaintiff, finding that one
of the expert's reports established the specific conduct of the nursing staff
that breached an accepted standard of nursing care, and two of the ex-
pert's reports established that this breach resulted in harm to the plaintiff.
Thus, the reports, taken together, established a causal relationship be-
tween the breach in care and the plaintiff's injuries. Therefore, the court
38. Id. at 452 (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(s)(2) (Vernon
2005)).
39. Id. at 453 (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 74.351(u) (Vernon
2005)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 454 (citing In re Miller, 133 S.W.3d 816 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, orig.
proceeding)).
42. Id. at 456.
43. Id.
44. 172 S.W.3d 55, 60 (Tex. App.-Waco 2005, pet. filed). The elements required for a




found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that
the three expert reports, considered together, contained the three statu-
tory requirements.45
In Cunningham v. Columbia/St. David's Healthcare System, L.P., the
court considered how an expert should be designated as a testifying ex-
pert so that his testimony is relevant for summary judgment considera-
tion. In this case, the plaintiff, Cunningham, sued Columbia, alleging that
medical negligence led to her father's death. The trial court granted a no-
evidence summary judgment motion, dismissing Cunningham's claim be-
cause the plaintiff had not offered expert testimony on the essential ele-
ments of her claim.46 On appeal, the Third Court of Appeals in Austin
held that "the rules requiring an expert to be designated before any testi-
mony from that expert can be admitted apply in summary judgment pro-
ceedings, such that a non-designated expert's affidavit cannot be
considered as summary judgment evidence absent a showing of good
cause or a lack of unfair surprise or prejudice. '47 Therefore, the court
had to determine whether the plaintiff showed either good cause for the
untimely designation of her expert or a lack of unfair surprise or
prejudice to the defense. The plaintiff argued that Columbia was not
prejudiced because she filed the expert's initial report. However, the
court stated that "[m]erely filing a medical malpractice expert's 4590i re-
port does not 'designate' that expert as a testifying witness so as to put
the opposing party on notice to prepare a rebuttal. '48 Therefore, a non-
designated expert's initial report will not serve to prevent unfair surprise
or prejudice if that expert's testimony is later presented as evidence for
summary-judgment purposes. Ruling that Columbia would be unfairly
surprised or prejudiced by the admission of the plaintiff's affidavit, the
court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by preventing
the plaintiff from presenting her expert.49
In the case of In re Wharton, Dr. George Wharton was retained as an
expert witness by the defendant in a personal-injury action. The plaintiff
had served Wharton with a deposition notice requesting him to produce
all of his 1099s for the five years prior, all reports that he had presented in
various cases, and the tax returns for his orthopedic-rehabilitation prac-
tice.50 Wharton sought mandamus relief to compel the trial court to with-
draw its order requiring production of these documents. The Tenth Court
of Appeals in Waco considered whether Wharton's potential bias or cred-
ibility issues permitted such broad discovery. The court considered the
effects of the 1999 amendment to the Rules of Civil Procedure on Rule
192.3(e)(5), which permits the discovery of any bias of a testifying or con-
45. Id.
46. 185 S.W.3d 7, 10 (Tex. App.-Austin 2005, no pet. h.).
47. Id. at 13.
48. Id. at 14.
49. Id.
50. In re Wharton, No. 10-04-00315-CV, 2005 WL 1405732, at *1-2 (Tex. App.-Waco
June 15, 2005, no pet. h.).
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sulting expert. The court found that the amendments did not change the
standard for a party seeking documents from a non-party expert for im-
peachment purposes-the party seeking discovery "must first present evi-
dence 'raising the possibility that [the expert] is biased."51 In this case,
the requesting party had presented no evidence that Wharton was biased.
Therefore, the court held that the lower court had abused its discretion in
ordering the discovery of Wharton's financial records and expert reports
from previous cases. 52
At issue in Palladian Building Company v. Nortex Foundation Designs,
Inc. was a motion to dismiss a negligence claim against a design profes-
sional for failure to file an expert's affidavit. In this case of first impres-
sion, the court was required to correctly construe Chapter 150 of the
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code addressing lawsuits against de-
sign professionals. A design professional is defined as "a registered archi-
tect or licensed professional engineer. '53 Under the statute, a plaintiff
alleging professional negligence against a design professional must file an
affidavit from a third-party design professional identifying at least one
negligent act, error, or omission on which the claim is based. In this case,
the plaintiff Palladian filed an original petition and an amended petition
but not the required expert's affidavit, and the trial court dismissed the
case without prejudice. Palladian attempted to appeal based on a claim
that the defendant, Nortex, had "waived its right to complain that Palla-
dian failed to file the required expert's affidavit because Nortex substan-
tially invoked the judicial process prior to filing its motion to dismiss." '54
Palladian alleged that because Nortex filed its original answer with the
court and sought affirmative relief by filing motions for summary judg-
ment, the doctrine of waiver applied and precluded Nortex from com-
plaining of Palladian's non-compliance with section 150.002. The Second
Court of Appeals in Fort Worth considered the issue of waiver but de-
cided that it need not determine "whether a plaintiff may in fact assert
the doctrine of waiver in response to a defendant's motion to dismiss
under section 150.002." 55 Nortex had taken "no action that would pre-
clude it from seeking dismissal of Palladian's lawsuit," because "it was
not unreasonable or inconsistent for Nortex to elect to file an original or
amended answer prior to filing its motion to dismiss for Palladian's fail-
ure to file the required expert's affidavit. '56 Therefore, the court held
that there was no abuse of discretion when the trial court dismissed Palla-
dian's suit for failure to file an expert affidavit. 5 7
51. Id. at *3 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 838 (Tex. 1992)).
52. Id. at *4.
53. 165 S.W.3d 430, 431 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet. h.) (quoting TEX. Civ.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 150.001 (Vernon 2005)).
54. Id. at 434.






The physician-patient privilege, the peer-review privilege, and the at-
torney-client privilege were all addressed this Survey period. While the
Texas Supreme Court ruled that nursing homes enjoy the same medical
committee, medical peer-review, and nursing peer-review privileges as
hospitals, the Corpus Christi and Beaumont Courts of Appeals grappled
with when an attorney can be deposed.
A. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE
In the case of In re Christus Health Southeast Texas, St. Mary Hospital
sought mandamus relief from an order requiring the hospital to produce
documents to one of the real parties in interest, Terry Russell. The plain-
tiff in the case, Russell, requested all documents outlining the chief com-
plaints and the triage codes of all the patients in the emergency room on
the day that he allegedly received negligent treatment. The hospital ob-
jected on grounds of physician-patient privilege. Russell argued that the
privilege did not apply because he was requesting the hospital's records
and not a physician's. In addition, he argued that the privilege belongs to
the patient, not the hospital, and that the hospital failed to show that it
was acting on behalf of the patients in resisting disclosure. 58 Under Rule
509 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, the patient or the patient's represen-
tative must claim the privilege of confidentiality. 59 The Court of Appeals
in Beaumont noted, however, that just because the hospital could not
claim or control the privilege, "does not mean the privilege does not exist
or can be ignored."'60 The court also pointed out that the plaintiff neither
included the patients as parties to the action nor served the non-party
patients with the request for production as required by Rule 196.1(c)(1)
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; thus, the patients had not been
given an opportunity to claim the privilege. Because there was nothing in
the record to suggest that the non-parties had consented to the disclosure,
the court stated that it was "loath" to allow the parties to unilaterally
waive the patients' privacy rights by failing to adhere to the discovery
rules.61 The appellate court therefore cautioned the trial court to "be
vigilant in ensuring the protection" of the non-parties' privacy rights and
"to give serious consideration to the interests of the nonparties, who are
unaware of this litigation, in maintaining the confidentiality of their medi-
cal records."'62 The appellate court also considered Rule 509 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence, which provides an exception to the physician-patient
privilege when the physical, mental, or emotional condition of a patient is
part of any party's claim or defense. The court noted that this exception
58. 167 S.W.3d 596, 597-98 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet. h.).
59. Id. at 601 (citing TEx. R. EVID. 509(d)(1)).
60. Id.
61. Id. (quoting In re CI Host, Inc., 92 S.W.3d 514, 517 (Tex. 2002)).
62. Id. at 603.
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applies "even though the patient is not a party to the litigation. '63 How-
ever, the Texas Supreme Court has stated that relevance alone cannot be
the test for overruling the privilege. The court therefore returned the
case to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether "the
other patients' medical conditions [were] part of plaintiffs' claims as
pleaded and not merely evidentiary or intermediate issues of fact."'64
Even if some of the non-parties' information fell into this exception or
was not privileged, the court cautioned that "any privileged information
not meeting an exception must be protected. '6 5 Thus, the trial court had
the responsibility to ensure that any production of documents was "no
broader than necessary" and that any privileged information not within
the exception was redacted or otherwise protected. 66 Therefore, the
court conditionally granted a writ of mandamus ordering the lower court
to vacate its order for discovery.
67
B. PEER REVIEW PRIVILEGE
In the case of In re Living Centers of Texas, Inc., the Texas Supreme
Court held that "nursing homes are protected by the medical committee,
medical peer-review, and nursing peer-review privileges to the same ex-
tent as hospitals. ' 68 After being sued by the survivor of a resident who
died in their care, Living Centers of Texas, Inc., a nursing home, withheld
several documents, asserting that they were protected by the medical
peer-review privilege. After the trial court ordered the nursing home to
produce any documents that were not stamped "privileged" and any priv-
ilege log documents that did not have the word "committee" in the name,
the nursing home requested mandamus relief.69 The Texas Supreme
Court noted that the point of the peer-review privilege is to protect the
reviewing process itself and not necessarily the documents produced by it.
The court stated, "the peer review privilege is intended to extend far
enough to foster candid internal discussions for the purpose of making
improvements in the quality of care, but not so far as to permit the con-
cealment of 'routinely accumulated information."' 70 Therefore, the privi-
lege would not prevent the discovery of otherwise-discoverable material
that had been presented to a peer-review committee. However, the peer-
review committee could not be forced to reveal such documents; rather,
the party seeking the disclosure would be required to find the documents
from a non-privileged source. While the privilege does not protect mate-
rial presented to the committee, it does protect the products of the pro-
cess itself, including reports, records, and deliberations. The court found
63. Id. at 601.
64. Id. at 603.
65. Id. at 602.
66. Id. at 603.
67. Id.
68. 175 S.W.3d 253, 259 (Tex. 2005).
69. Id. at 255.
70. Id. at 260 (quoting Barnes v. Whittington, 751 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. 1988)).
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that some of the documents that the trial court had ordered to be pro-
duced should have been protected by the peer-review privilege, and thus
ordered the trial court to conduct further in camera review of the docu-
ments according to its holding in order to protect the privilege. The
Texas Supreme Court wrote that
[u]pon further review, the trial court must determine: (1) whether
the existing evidence establishes the privileged status of any docu-
ments without the need for an in camera inspection; (2) whether to
conduct an in camera inspection of additional documents or catego-
ries of documents in light of this opinion; (3) whether the additional
documents, if furnished, are privileged; and (4) whether [the nursing
home], by failing to produce all documents for in camera inspection,
failed to satisfy its burden to prove privilege.
7
Concluding that the nursing home was entitled to mandamus relief, the
supreme court directed the trial court to vacate its discovery order and to
further examine the documents based on this holding.7
2
C. ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
In the case of In re Mason & Co. Property Management, the defendant
sought a writ of mandamus compelling the respondent, the judge of the
107th District Court of Cameron County, Texas, to vacate his order deny-
ing the defendant the opportunity to depose two attorneys involved with
the case. In this case, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant negligently
drafted a commercial lease. The defendant stated that he needed the tes-
timony of the attorney witnesses in order to establish the affirmative de-
fense of ratification and estoppel. According to the defendant, the
plaintiff adopted and ratified terms of the original lease in an extension,
which thereby ratified the allegedly defective clause in the option and
estopped the plaintiff from claiming that the lease was improperly
drafted. The defendant claimed that he wanted to discover only the com-
munications between the two attorneys involved and not those between
the attorneys and their clients.7 3 The Thirteenth Court of Appeals in
Corpus Christi held that it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to allow
the defendant to depose the two attorneys. The court stated that "an
attorney may be deposed, even if he or she represents a party to the liti-
gation in issue. ' '74 The court further stated that:
[tihe attorney-client privilege was never intended to foreclose any
opportunity to depose an attorney, but rather only precludes those
questions which may somehow invade upon the attorney-client con-
fidences. An attorney may not avoid a deposition in its entirety
merely because some matters may be privileged, but must object
when those inquiries are raised during the deposition. Other matters
71. Id. at 261-62.
72. Id. at 261.
73. 172 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet. h.).
74. Id. at 313.
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may exist which are not privileged and which an attorney may be
called upon to answer.75
The court did note that, although deposing a party's attorney is a possi-
bility, it is disfavored because of the importance of protecting the attor-
ney-client privilege. In this case, however, each of the claims was
premised on the attorney's drafting of the option to purchase contained
in the lease. Therefore, whether or not the affirmative defense of ratifica-
tion and estoppel could be pursued depended on the communications be-
tween the two attorneys.76 The defendant had "shown that it [was]
seeking discovery relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in this law-
suit and that discovery [was] necessary to the presentation of its case." 77
The court also noted that "to the extent that [the defendant] seeks to
discover communications between [the attorneys], such communications
would not be covered by the attorney-client privilege. ' 78 Therefore, the
court held that mandamus should be granted, allowing the attorneys to be
deposed and to raise the attorney-client privilege when appropriate dur-
ing the questioning.79
In In re Baptist Hospitals of Southeast Texas, the plaintiff filed a motion
to quash the deposition of one of its attorneys. The trial court denied the
motion and allowed the defendant to proceed with the deposition. The
plaintiff sought mandamus relief from the Ninth Court of Appeals in
Beaumont.80 While considering the case, the appellate court stated that
an issue crucial to the outcome of the mandamus hearing was whether
"the attorney noticed for deposition [was] the attorney of record in on-
going litigation who [had] been ordered to testify concerning the subject
matter of the litigation. 81 The defendant attempted to argue, based on
the attorney's involvement in a building project, that the attorney was not
actually working as an attorney, but rather as an engineer or a manager.
Since the attorney's work was not actually work product, it was proper
subject matter for deposition.82 The court disagreed with the defendant's
assessment of the plaintiff's attorney:
Performing the function of a lawyer does not preclude a litigation
attorney from observing, investigating, monitoring, and evaluating
the facts surrounding the matter in controversy. The evidence does
not show [the attorney] was a fact witness divorced from the litiga-
tion. His work was reasonably related to and in furtherance of the
prosecution of [the plaintiff's] case against the defendants.8 3
75. Id. (quoting Borden Inc. v. Valdez, 773 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1989, orig. proceeding)).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 314.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. 172 S.W.3d 136, 139 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet. h.).
81. Id. at 140.
82. Id. at 142.
83. Id. at 143.
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Therefore, the court held that the attorney's activities fell under the
work-product privilege and conditionally granted mandamus relief
preventing his deposition.8 4
At issue in In re Graco Children's Products, Inc. was whether a general
attorney-client objection could function as a waiver of each specific ob-
jection. In this products-liability action, the plaintiff alleged that the child
car seat manufacturer's design defect caused the death of her five-week-
old son. The defendant made a general assertion of attorney-client and
work-product privileges to all of the plaintiff's requests and produced a
withholding statement. The judge in the lower court ruled that, by mak-
ing such blanket objections, the defendant failed to preserve all privi-
leges. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals in Corpus Christi held that the
judge had abused her discretion in reaching this conclusion.85 The defen-
dant's withholding statement said that, based on the attorney-client privi-
lege, the defendant was withholding documents otherwise responsive to
plaintiff's Fourth Request for Production, numbering each question. The
appeals court stated that "[a]s such, the withholding statement complied
with the requirements of the rule."'86 Therefore, the defendant did not
waive any privileges with this broad attorney-client objection and main-
tained a specific objection for each document.87
At issue in Bright v. Addison was whether enough evidence existed to
support a trial judge's finding of an attorney-client relationship between
the plaintiffs and the defendant that would imply a fiduciary duty be-
tween the parties. After a bench trial, the trial judge found that the de-
fendant usurped the plaintiffs' opportunity to manage a casino. The court
also found that the defendant was the plaintiffs' attorney and thus
awarded the plaintiffs damages based on, inter alia, breach of fiduciary
duty. The defendant, however, claimed that he was merely the plaintiffs'
business associate and never acted as their attorney. On appeal, the Fifth
Court of Appeals in Dallas found that the evidence suggested that the
defendant acted both as the plaintiffs' attorney and business associate.
For example, the defendant oversaw construction at casinos, purchased
furniture, bought equipment, and participated in various other activities
related to casino operations. But the defendant also incorporated corpo-
rations, negotiated contracts, and advised the plaintiffs on legal issues.
Further, the defendant admitted at trial that he had performed legal work
for the plaintiffs and advised the plaintiffs of the attorney-client privilege.
The plaintiffs even sent the defendant an engagement letter based on this
advice in order to preserve attorney-client privilege; when the defendant
received the letter, he never contradicted the fact that the plaintiffs had
engaged his services as an attorney. Therefore, the appeals court held
that "there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the
84. Id. at 143-44, 146.
85. 173 S.W.3d 600, 601 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2005, no pet. h.).
86. Id. at 604.
87. Id. at 605.
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trial judge's finding of an attorney-client relationship between" the plain-
tiffs and the defendant. 88
IV. SPOLIATION
In Texas Electric Cooperative v. Dillard, plaintiff sued Texas Electric
Cooperative ("TEC") and the driver of a TEC truck for her husband's
death. In this case, a TEC driver ran into a cow, left the cow in the road,
and did not attempt to warn motorists of its presence. The cow carcass
caused another accident in which the plaintiff's husband died. The de-
fendants contended that the trial court erred in submitting a spoliation
instruction to the jury regarding the truck driver's logs for that trip. The
defendant admitted that it destroyed the driver's log books and docu-
ments relating to the trip, but claimed that it was the policy of the com-
pany to destroy records after six months. The trial court instructed the
jury that if the disappearance or non-production of the logs was not "sat-
isfactorily explained," the jury could "consider that such evidence con-
tained information adverse to the position taken by the party" who was in
"exclusive possession and control" of the document. 89 The Twelfth Court
of Appeals in Tyler noted that in order to establish a spoliation claim, the
party alleging spoliation had to show that the opposing side that de-
stroyed the evidence "had notice both of the potential claim and of the
evidence's potential relevance thereto." 90 Further, the test "for anticipa-
tion of litigation is whether a reasonable person would conclude from the
severity of the accident and other circumstances surrounding it that there
was a substantial chance for litigation." 9 1 In this case, correspondence
between the plaintiff's attorney and the defendants began well within the
six-month period during which the logs were kept. Therefore, the court
held that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in instructing the
jury on spoliation because the defense had reasonable notification of up-
coming litigation. 92
V. SANCTIONS
In State v. PR Investments & Specialty Retailers, Inc., a condemnation
case, the State of Texas appealed the trial court's dismissal of a suit that
sought condemnation of part of a privately owned tract of land. Five days
before the trial date, the State changed the specifics of the project, but
did not change the allegations in the pleadings or the portion of property
it sought to condemn. The trial court dismissed the action and sanctioned
the State with attorney's fees and expenses. The trial court justified its
imposition of sanctions against the State on the grounds that the State
had proceeded to trial using a fictitious building plan, knowing that it
88. 171 S.W.3d 588, 596-97 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. filed).
89. 171 S.W.3d 201, 208 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2005, no pet. h.).





would change the project at the last moment to an altogether different
plan. The trial court found that this constituted bad faith and harassment.
The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston found that the trial
court had abused its discretion in basing sanctions on this change of plans
because "Rule 13 sanctions are not based on a party's conduct during the
prosecution of the action; rather, they are based on the signing and filing
of pleadings in violation of the duties imposed by Rule 13."93 Because
the trial court did not find that the State's counsel signed the original
condemnation or the amended condemnation petition knowing that it
was groundless or brought in bad faith or that State's counsel signed the
amended condemnation petition believing it to be groundless or brought
in bad faith, no evidence would support Rule 13 sanctions. The appellate
court could find no evidence "that any party or attorney filed this con-
demnation action or any pleading herein as an experiment to get an opin-
ion from the court. Therefore, the trial court erred to the extent that it
assessed Rule 13 sanctions on this basis."'94
In Sadeghian v. Webb, the plaintiff sued multiple defendants, alleging
trespass and destruction of property. One of the defendants, Wilson,
filed an original answer with a general denial and a counterclaim request-
ing sanctions, alleging that the plaintiff's claims were groundless and
brought in bad faith. Co-defendants Jerry and Janice Webb also filed an
original answer with a denial; however, they did not file a counterclaim
seeking sanctions. After a sanctions hearing, the court signed a judgment
that gave the plaintiff nothing and awarded sanctions both to Wilson and
the Webbs. The sanctions order stated that the court, on its own motion,
applied Wilson's request for sanctions under Rule 13 to the Webbs be-
cause the sanctions issues were identical.95 After the trial court entered
the sanctions order in favor of the Webbs, the plaintiff appealed the
granting of sanctions against him, alleging that the sanctions were im-
proper because he did not have fair notice under Rule 13 that the court
might award them to the Webbs. 96 On appeal, the Second Court of Ap-
peals in Fort Worth concluded that the plaintiff was never put on notice
by the Webbs or by the trial court that sanctions might be awarded
against him as to the Webbs. Therefore, the court held that the trial court
abused its discretion in awarding those sanctions.97
In the case of In re K.A.R., an ex-husband brought a custody action
against his former wife and then nonsuited his claims. The ex-wife
counter-petitioned for modification and moved for sanctions against her
ex-husband and his counsel. 98 The trial court granted the requested re-
lief, and the ex-husband appealed on various grounds, including the fact
93. 180 S.W.3d 654, 663 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. filed).
94. Id. at 671-72.
95. No. 2-03-367-CV, 2005 WL 737424, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Mar. 31, 2005,
no pet. h.).
96. Id. at *4.
97. Id. at *7.
98. 171 S.W.3d 708-09, 713 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.).
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that he had only received four days' notice before the sanctions hearing.
He claimed that he was entitled to six days' notice under Rules 21 and
21a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and that the trial court had
abused its discretion and violated his due-process rights by failing to give
him such notice. The Fourteenth District Court of Appeals in Houston
disagreed, noting that even if the three-day notice period under Rule 21
was extended to six days by Rule 21a, Rule 21 still would allow the trial
court to shorten the notice period. The ex-husband's counsel admitted to
receiving a fax regarding the motion for sanctions and the hearing to be
held four days later. The following afternoon, the ex-husband and his
counsel filed a motion for continuance of the trial setting, but did not file
a motion to continue the sanctions hearing, a motion to reset the sanc-
tions hearing, or any objection based on insufficient notice. Therefore,
the court held that "even if the rules ordinarily would have required six
days' notice, the trial court did not abuse its discretion or violate [the ex-
husband's and his counsel's] due process rights in shortening the notice
period to four days." 99 Thus, the notice issue was not held to be adequate
grounds for overturning the sanctions 00
In Greene v. Young, a sanctions order was reversed on the basis of lack
of proper notice. In this case, the family court granted sanctions based on
authority other than Rule 13. The appellants appealed because the sanc-
tions originally were sought only under Rule 13. The motion made no
mention of Chapter 10, the family court's inherent power to sanction, the
Disciplinary Rules, or the Lawyers' Creed, all of which the family court
had cited as legal bases for the sanctions that it imposed. The court held
that the family court improperly relied on rules other than Rule 13 and
did not give appellants proper notice that the questionable conduct would
be under consideration for sanctions under these rules. Therefore, the
appellants could not prepare an appropriate defense to sanctions other
than the Rule 13 sanctions. Thus, the court held that it was an abuse of
the family court's discretion to sanction the appellants on the basis of
claims about which they had no notice.10 1
In Mantri v. Bergman, the Fifth Court of Appeals in Dallas had to de-
termine whether a claim for sanctions under Chapter 10 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code could be brought in an independent lawsuit
in a court and county different from the underlying litigation. In this
case, the plaintiff, Angela Allen, sued Dr. Suhas Mantri for medical mal-
practice. Allen nonsuited Dr. Mantri in December of 2002 in Denton
County, where she originally brought suit. In August of 2003, Mantri
sued Allen in Dallas County, seeking sanctions for frivolous litigation
under Chapter 10. The trial court held that a party seeking such sanctions
was required to bring the sanctions motion in the same action as the friv-
99. Id. at 713.
100. Id.
101. 174 S.W.3d 291, 298-99 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. denied).
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olous litigation and therefore could not seek sanctions independently.10 2
The appellate court noted that the terminology of the rule suggested that
a party could file a motion for sanctions regarding litigation proceedings,
but no language suggested the existence of an independent cause of ac-
tion. Additionally, "[w]hen a motion for sanctions is filed following the
entry of a final judgment, the motion is treated as a motion to modify,
correct, or reform the existing judgment within the meaning of rule of
civil procedure 329b(g)."' 10 3 Therefore, the court held that the "only
court with jurisdiction over a request for sanctions (whether styled as a
motion or otherwise) under Chapter 10 is the court where the allegedly
frivolous litigation was pending, and then only while the court has ple-
nary jurisdiction over the cause in which the allegedly frivolous litigation
was pending.' 0 4 Therefore, the court held that the Dallas County dis-
trict court did not have jurisdiction over any proceeding for sanctions
arising from the Denton County claims. 10 5
The case of Leon's Fine Foods of Texas, Inc. v. Merit Investment Part-
ners, L.P. "demonstrates what may happen to a client when its attorney
suffers from severe depression.' 0 6 In this case, Leon's former attorney
had failed to file a response to any of Merit's requests for disclosures,
failed to answer interrogatories, and failed to produce witnesses for depo-
sition. Thereafter, Merit moved to strike the pleadings and to impose
sanctions. The trial court imposed death-penalty sanctions against
Leon's. Leon's attorney, however, did not attend the sanctions hearing;
Leon's did not even know about the sanctions hearing. Leon's former
attorney also falsely told the company's president that the trial court had
rescheduled the trial date. Therefore, Leon's did not know about the de-
fault-judgment hearing. However, "despite the fact that Leon's had no
part in the discovery abuse by its former attorney and had no knowledge
of the sanctions hearing or the February 27 and March 13 hearings, the
trial court denied Leon's motion for new trial."'01 7 On appeal, the Elev-
enth Court of Appeals in Eastland found that the trial court erred in im-
posing death-penalty sanctions against Leon's. Quoting the Texas
Supreme Court, the court stated "that 'death penalty sanctions should not
be used to deny a trial on the merits' unless the guilty party's conduct is
so bad that it 'justifies a presumption that its claims or defenses lack
merit.""' 0 8 Finding it reasonable that Leon's had trusted its attorney
under the circumstances, the court held that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in issuing sanctions against Leon's, which neither knew of the
hearings nor engaged in any bad conduct. 0 9
102. 153 S.W.3d 715, 716-17 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, pet. denied).
103. Id. at 718.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. 160 S.W.3d 148, 149 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2005, no pet. h.).
107. Id.




VI. MISCELLANEOUS DECISIONS OF NOTE
A. HEARSAY
In the case of Gabriel v. Lovewell, the plaintiff, a horse owner, at-
tempted to introduce his conversation with a veterinarian into evidence.
In this conversation, the veterinarian allegedly attributed part of the
cause of the horse's death to the defendant. The court would not allow
such testimony because it was hearsay. However, by asking the veterina-
rian if he told the horse owner that the horse died because the defendant
did not bring it to the veterinary clinic sooner, the defense opened the
door to the testimony and the trial court allowed it.11° The Sixth Court of
Appeals in Texarkana held that, because the horse owner's testimony
pertained to the same subject matter as the veterinarian's and directly
contradicted the veterinarian's testimony, the horse owner's testimony
was admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching the veterinarian.
Therefore, the trial court was held to have properly admitted the testi-
mony over the defense's objection."1
At issue in In re Estate of Steed was whether the deceased's assistant,
Daniel Hutton, could testify as to statements made by the deceased about
why he created his will. The assistant stated that the deceased wanted to
pacify his wife and get her "off the 'warpath.' "112 The testator's son
wanted the evidence to be admitted in order to show that his father was
under undue influence when he wrote his will. The Texas Supreme Court
has held that a decedent's statements can be used to show the second
element of undue influence, the collapse of the testator's own will, be-
cause the statements show the testator's mental condition. But the su-
preme court has also stated that such testimony is not admissible when
offered to prove the first element, that an external pressure was exerted
on the testator, because the testimony would be offered to prove the mat-
ter asserted and would thus be hearsay. However, Rule 802 of the Texas
Rules of Evidence now provides that inadmissible hearsay made without
objection should not be denied probative value. In this case, the state-
ments were admitted without objection, and therefore the evidence could
not "be said to have no probative value even if the statements were hear-
say."1 1 3 Therefore, the court of appeals held that the testator's declara-
tions to his assistant could be "considered on both components of undue
influence: the external factor (pressure by another party) and the internal
factor (class of the testator's mind or will)."1 1 4
In Tri-Steel Structures, Inc. v. Baptist Foundation of Texas, the Second
Court of Appeals in Fort Worth held that an unsigned letter was not ad-
missible under the Rule 803(15) hearsay exception for documents affect-
ing an interest in property. The issue in this case was whether portions of
110. 164 S.W.3d 835, 841-42 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2005, no pet. h.).
111. Id. at 842-43.
112. 152 S.W.3d 797, 807 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, pet. denied).




an unsigned letter between two of the parties were subject to the hearsay
exception. The court of appeals noted that most cases interpreting this
rule of evidence "require that the document have some sort of official or
formal nature, which an unsigned letter does not possess. Further, the
rule requires that dealings with the property not be inconsistent with the
statement after it was made. ' 115 In this case, even though a letter was
exchanged between the parties, the letter was unsigned. In addition, fol-
lowing the letter exchange, the landlord did not treat the tenant's inter-
pretation of its property interests consistently with the letter allegedly
exchanged between them. Therefore, the court held that the letter was
properly excluded from evidence. 116
B. JUDICIAL NOTICE
The Texas Supreme Court in In re J.L. held that expert testimony
heard during criminal proceedings against a mother and her husband for
the death of her child was not subject to judicial notice in a parental-
rights-termination proceeding concerning her other child. The expert
doctor, testifying in criminal proceedings against the parents of the child
who died, seemed to contradict the autopsy performed by a different doc-
tor. Nevertheless, the appellate court purported to take "judicial notice"
of the doctor's testimony from the criminal trial in the civil proceeding to
determine custody.117 Considering the requirements for a judicially no-
ticed fact, which must either be generally known or capable of accurate
and ready determination, the supreme court held that because the doc-
tor's testimony "concerned disputed facts and opinions, it should not
have been judicially noticed. 1" 8
In the case of In re A.C.S. & G.E.S., former spouses filed motions to
modify child-custody orders after the former wife moved with the chil-
dren to South Carolina. At issue in the case was whether the former wife
interfered with the former husband's visitation rights. During trial, testi-
mony was taken about travel expenses for visitation. The judge com-
pared the costs and time of travel between Houston and either Dallas or
San Antonio and travel between Texas and South Carolina. The trial
judge stated that he knew that a person could get an airline ticket from
Houston to Dallas for about $100 with flight times lasting only about an
hour, and therefore took judicial notice of those facts. Based on this, the
court found that the former wife's move to South Carolina substantially
increased the cost of transportation and time required for the former hus-
band to share custody, making it nearly prohibitive. 1 9 The appellate
court acknowledged that a trial court may take judicial notice of a fact
that is generally known or capable of accurate and ready determination.
115. 166 S.W.3d 443, 450-511 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2005, pet. denied).
116. Id. at 451.
117. 163 S.W.3d 79, 83 (Tex. 2005).
118. Id. at 84.
119. 157 S.W.3d 9, 21 (Tex. App.-Waco 2004, no pet. h.).
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However, the court asserted that "personal knowledge is not judicial
knowledge, and a judge may personally know a fact of which he cannot
take judicial knowledge. ' 120 Therefore, the court found that the lower
court had abused its discretion by finding that an increase in transporta-
tion costs after a move to South Carolina was prohibitive and that costs
and travel times would be less if the former wife returned with the chil-
dren to Texas. The trial judge could not take notice of his own personal
knowledge about flight prices and flight times within Texas. 121
C. PAROL EVIDENCE RULE
In Baroid Equipment, Inc. v. Odeco Drilling, Inc., the First District
Court of Appeals in Houston considered whether Odeco, which operated
a semi-submersible drilling rig and worked as the purchasing agent for a
rig builder, entered into an oral contract with Baroid, which supplied
equipment to the rig. Odeco claimed that an oral contract existed that
created warranties running to Odeco in excess of, and in addition to, the
warranties Baroid had already given to the rig builder through a written
contract. 122 The lower court found that an oral contract did exist be-
tween Odeco and Baroid. Baroid appealed the ruling, claiming that the
alleged oral contract was not enforceable because the parol evidence rule
barred consideration of earlier oral warranties inconsistent with the writ-
ten warranty in the purchase order. Specifically, Baroid claimed that any
earlier warranties that it made were merged into the final written contract
and, therefore, could not be used to contradict the terms of the written
contract. In order to determine whether or not the parol evidence rule
applied, the appellate court had to determine the relationship between
the parties. Although in general, two contracts must be between the
same two parties in order to merge, the court stated that "in some in-
stances, the third party has been so involved with the creation of the writ-
ten contract, or is claiming rights under the contract such that he is bound
to abide by its terms, i.e., he is no longer a stranger to the contract. '123
The court determined that Odeco was not a stranger to the written con-
tract between Baroid and the rig operator, and therefore Odeco could
not "offer parol evidence of an oral agreement that conflict[ed] with or
add[ed] to the terms of the written contract that it negotiated on behalf of
[the rig operator]. '124
120. Id. at 22.
121. Id.
122. 184 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. filed).
123. Id. at 13-14.
124. Id. at 15.
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